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Abstract. Starting from the early decades of the twentieth century, evolutionary
biology began to acquire mathematical overtones. This took place via the development
of a set of models in which the Darwinian picture of evolution was shown to be
consistent with the laws of heredity discovered by Mendel. The models, which came to
be elaborated over the years, define a field of study known as population genetics.
Population genetics is generally looked upon as an essential component of modern
evolutionary theory. This article deals with a famous dispute between J. B. S. Haldane,
one of the founders of population genetics, and Ernst Mayr, a major contributor to the
way we understand evolution. The philosophical undercurrents of the dispute remain
relevant today. Mayr and Haldane agreed that genetics provided a broad explanatory
framework for explaining how evolution took place but differed over the relevance of
the mathematical models that sought to underpin that framework. The dispute began
with a fundamental issue raised by Mayr in 1959: in terms of understanding evolution,
did population genetics contribute anything beyond the obvious? Haldane’s response
came just before his death in 1964. It contained a spirited defense, not just of population
genetics, but also of the motivations that lie behind mathematical modelling in biology.
While the difference of opinion persisted and was not glossed over, the two continued to
maintain cordial personal relations.
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I am an unrepentant ‘beanbag geneticist.’ Non-mathematicians
often fail to realise the complexity of behaviour and sometimes the
self-regulatory capacity of material systems composed of simple
components. (J. B. S. Haldane)1
The mistake is in thinking that through mathematical formulae,
you can arrive at the truth. That’s wrong. (Ernst Mayr)2
Introduction
Three events demarcate the dispute that forms the subject of this article.
The first was the discovery by Gregor Mendel in 1866 of the laws of
inheritance. The second was the general validation and elaboration of
those laws by (among others) Thomas Hunt Morgan and his school.
The third ‘event’ variously is known as the Evolutionary Synthesis, the
Modern Synthesis or (less frequently) the neo-Darwinian Synthesis (for
the sake of uniformity we stick to ‘Evolutionary Synthesis’ in this
article). It consisted of a combination of two developments. On the one
hand, with the help of Mendel’s rules and statistical principles, a
mathematical formulation of evolutionary change was constructed.
At the same time, and almost in parallel, a series of detailed studies in
palaeontology, systematics and genetics made a convincing case for the
claim that the basis of adaptive evolution was natural selection.
Only the barest description can be given here of what the Evolu-
tionary Synthesis involved. Its progress is easily tracked thanks to
numerous signposts: landmark books and major articles, published
proceedings of scientific meetings, and biographies. The volume edited
by Mayr and Provine3 is a goldmine in that it contains perceptive his-
torical analyses, reminiscences by participants and an extensive bibli-
ography. Smocovitis deconstructs the Synthesis and emphasises its
1 Letter dated 8 May 1963 from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr (No. HUGFP 74.7,
BOX 9, F 820; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA, USA).
2 Ernst Mayr, interviewed by Michael Shermer and Frank J. Sulloway for ‘‘Skeptic’’
(8 January 2000; see http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/04-07-05).
3 Mayr and Provine, 1980, 1998.
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philosophical bases.4 Lasting roughly from the early 1900s through the
1950s, the synthesis was a communal enterprise that involved the uni-
fication of a range of disciplines – genetics, systematics, palaeontology,
botany and zoology – under the common rubric of Darwinian evolu-
tion, meaning, on the whole, natural selection. (Biochemistry, molecular
biology, cell biology, developmental biology and ecology do not
conform entirely to the rule, because in certain respects they are also
engaged in negotiating with various ‘non-Darwinian’ explanatory
frameworks. One can view this as a broadening of the Synthesis.5) It
showed how the laws of Mendel and the facts of organismal evolution
could form part of one consistent framework – based largely, though
not entirely, on natural selection. Mayr described it as follows6:
The term ‘evolutionary synthesis’ was introduced by Julian Huxley
in Evolution: The Modern Synthesis (1942) to designate the general
acceptance of two conclusions: gradual evolution can be explained
in terms of small genetic changes (‘mutations’), recombination, and
the ordering of the variation by natural selection; and the observed
evolutionary phenomena, particularly macroevolutionary pro-
cesses and speciation, can be explained in a manner that is con-
sistent with the known genetic mechanisms.
The first step in the Synthesis was the recognition that the mechanism
of Mendelian (‘particulate’) genetics implied a conservation law: in the
absence of any tendency to the contrary (e.g. mutation, migration or
selection), heritable variation would be preserved – at least in sufficiently
large populations. This supplied a missing element in the theory of nat-
ural selection, one that had plagued Darwin, and made it plausible that
trait differences between individuals would always remain available for
selection to act on. Therefore, to the extent that (a) traits were associated
with genes and (b) trait differences between individuals were associated
with differential survival and reproduction, natural selection was a suf-
ficient explanation for the evolution of traits within populations – and
4 Smocovitis, 1992.
5 It is commonly assumed that a Darwinian explanation means one based on natural
selection. Strictly speaking, this is incorrect. In fact Darwin was ‘‘convinced that Nat-
ural Selection has been the main but not exclusive means of modification [of species]’’
(The Origin of Species, 1st edition). Still, one imagines that he would have been
astonished by the variety of alternatives to natural selection that are seriously discussed
today. Our use of ‘non-Darwinian’ refers to explanations involving concepts such as
self-organisation and niche construction besides the more familiar neutral theory of
molecular evolution.
6 Mayr and Provine, 1980 and 1998, p. 1.
GENETICS DISPUTE
perhaps, by extension, as Darwin had hypothesised, accounted for the
differences between species and higher groups as well. (The italicised
words in the previous sentence set out an operational programme for
evolutionary biologists; they imply that evolutionary biology is an
empirical science and natural selection is not a tautology.) The apparent
discrepancy between a quasi-continuous distribution of morphological
traits and the discrete alternatives offered by single gene variation was
bridged when it was realised that a single trait could depend on a large
number of genes. The Synthesis showed that certain views that had been
put forward until then, some of them associated with the name of La-
marck, others with that of Mendel, were untenable: for example directed
evolution, whether guided by the environment or ‘inner drive;’ evolution
via the inheritance of acquired traits; and evolution throughmutations of
major effect (saltationism).
The relevant arguments made use of quantitative treatments of ge-
netic change. They led to the setting up of an algorithm for calculating
gene (or genotype) frequencies in one generation from their values in the
previous generation. In outline, the steps went as follows: Genotype
frequencies in zygotes fi Genotype frequencies in adults fi Gene
frequencies in the germ line fi Genotype frequencies in zygotes. (Each
arrow implies a set of events specified by genetics, physiology, devel-
opment, behaviour, demography, mating structure, the physical and
biological environments, and so on, with the relevant probabilities
depending on the underlying genetic makeup.) The mathematical
component of the Synthesis – known as population genetics – fuelled the
‘‘Beanbag Genetics’’ dispute. The dispute was initiated during a sym-
posium held 50 years ago to mark the centenary of the publication of
The Origin of Species. Its chief protagonists were two of the leaders of
post-Darwinian evolutionary biology, Ernst Mayr and J. B. S. Haldane.
Aspects of the beanbag genetics dispute have been discussed before.
Some authors have focussed on issues pertaining to evolutionary biol-
ogy, some on history and philosophy.7 We touch on these matters only
peripherally; the original literature should be consulted for technical
details. Our aim is to present a sketch of the dispute as it occurred, in
a roughly chronological order. We make use of the beanbag genetics
dispute to illustrate several themes. One theme concerns divergent views
of the roles of mathematics and model building in biology. A subsidiary
theme is the perceived tension between organismal biology and the
7 Ewens, 1993; De Winter, 1997; Crow, 2001, 2009; Sarkar, 2005; Borges, 2008.
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then-nascent field of quantitative evolutionary biology.8 Based on a
reading of previously unpublished correspondence, we show that the
dispute was conducted within the context of a deep friendship between
Mayr and Haldane that survived unscathed.
The remaining portion of the text is organised as follows. We begin by
outlining the larger background within which the dispute was embedded;
that requires giving a brief description of the history of population
genetics and the Evolutionary Synthesis. Next we introduce the pro-
tagonists, explain the basis of their disagreement and contrast it with the
level of friendship that they maintained in the face of fundamental sci-
entific disagreements. This is evident from the letters they wrote; the
exchanges ran from 1951 to 1964, when Haldane died. We cite diverse
opinions on the dispute and point out that the rise of molecular biology
contributed to organismal biologists’ qualms about population genetics.
The article concludes with a summing-up in which we comment on the
different ways of assessing the role of theories andmodels in biology. The
main text is interspersed with extracts from letters between Haldane and
Mayr that chart their relationship during the period of the dispute,
provide insights into their thinking about evolution and their feelings for
each other. The correspondence is within specifically demarcated por-
tions and can be read as a parallel narrative on its own.
Background
Mendelians and Biometricians
The rediscovery of Mendel’s laws of heredity in 1900 was followed by a
period of uneasy coexistence between what we would today consider
two bedrocks of biology: the laws of Mendel and the Darwinian prin-
ciple of evolution by natural selection. So much so, that many wondered
whether Mendel’s laws and natural selection had anything to do with
each other at all. The upshot was that for a long time, students of
evolution were divided into two rival camps.9 At the risk of some
oversimplification, their views can be described as follows.
8 A sense of discomfort associated with mathematical reasoning and a concomitant
reluctance to accept the validity of arguments based on it, is not entirely absent among
whole-organism biologists today either. This is especially because of what are believed
to be over-simplifications. For more on this see the ‘‘Summing Up’’ section.
9 Mayr, 1982; Provine, 1971 and 2001.
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For the ‘Biometricians’ or ‘Darwinists,’ evolution occurred by nat-
ural selection along the lines explained by Darwin and Wallace. They
believed that evolution took place quasi-continuously, in tiny steps.
Each step was the result of selection acting on a set of pre-existing
variations. The sequential accumulation of many steps over time led to
differences in traits between ancestral and descendent populations; the
differences were exaggerated versions of the traits that existed within a
species. (A large increase in the average height over many generations
could be an example of an evolutionary change that had been built on
small differences in heights among the members of a species at any given
time.) Over still more time, quantitative differences deepened to become
qualitative differences. Accordingly, by studying variations within
populations and correlations between relatives in respect of quantitative
traits, Biometricians sought to infer the rules that would constrain the
course of evolution. For them, the rate of evolution was determined by
the rate of natural selection, not the rate at which variations (muta-
tions) arose. The qualitative or gross differences between individuals
and varieties (that had occupied the attention of geneticists beginning
with Mendel) appeared to be irrelevant for understanding how evolu-
tion worked. Framed thus, the Biometricians’ point of view appeared to
be in accordance with the Darwinian picture of evolution as a gradual
process of change.
Against that, the Mendelians based their arguments on hereditary
changes with gross effects that were easily observed. The changes
were ascribed to abrupt alterations, mutations, in the particulate
entities, genes, whose existence implicitly had been postulated by
Mendel (though the words ‘gene’ and ‘mutation’ came much after
him). Other than trivial modifications (like increased height), said the
Mendelians, evolutionary change was a reflection of qualitative or
discrete alterations in traits. The alterations were consequences of
gene mutations: in essence, mutation was evolution. Therefore the
rate of mutation, rather than the rate of natural selection, was the
pacesetter of evolution. Mendelians asserted that the tiny changes
that interested the Darwinians, and were required by the theory of
natural selection, were irrelevant for what was important in evolu-
tion. Instead, the focus had to be on the major transitions that had
occurred during evolution. According to them the transitions could
have resulted from mutations of large effect. This implied, they said,
that evolution in the large and evolution by natural selection were
two different categories of phenomena.
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Population Genetics
Starting from the early decades of the twentieth century, evolutionary
biology began to acquire mathematical overtones. A set of models was
developed in which the Darwinian picture of evolution was shown to be
consistent with the laws of heredity discovered by Mendel. These
models, associated primarily with the names of R. A. Fisher, J. B. S.
Haldane, S. Wright, and S. S. Chetverikov, are a component of modern
evolutionary theory and define a field of study known as population
genetics.10 Some of the models were deterministic and made precise
predictions whereas others included a consideration of stochastic effects,
dealt in probabilities and led to statistical predictions. They showed that
rather than being opposed to Darwinian evolution, the rules of Men-
delian inheritance in fact provided just the underpinning that it
required. J. T. Bonner puts it thus:
The tide turned with the rise of population genetics, in which R. A.
Fisher, J. B. S. Haldane, and S. Wright used mathematics to show
how selection and other factors which lead to change, could alter the
frequency of individual genes in a population. This new approach
was somewhat grandly called ‘the new synthesis,’ and T. Dobz-
hansky, A.H. Sturtevant, E.Mayr, and others didmuch to expand it
to questions of how new species arise and to other global evolu-
tionary problems.11
Mayr gives a pithy description of what the models achieved: they
showed that ‘there is no conflict between particulate (non-blending)
inheritance, continuous variation, and natural selection.’12 There were
three principal reasons behind the success of these early models of
population genetics. (a) They portrayed the process of evolutionary
change in terms of a change in the genetic composition of a species. (b)
They defined the genetic makeup of an individual in terms of the genes
(strictly, alleles) at each locus in that genome, and the genetic compo-
sition of a population in terms of the relative frequencies of the different
genes (again, alleles). (c) For practical reasons, mostly, they restricted
themselves to treating situations in which different genetic compositions
10 The birth of population genetics preceded these models. A notable event was the
recognition in 1908 by W. Weinberg and (some 6 months later) G. H. Hardy of an
important implication of the conservation law alluded to earlier: in large, random-
mating, Mendelian populations, genotype frequencies attain a stable equilibrium after
one round of mating. See Provine (1971) for details.
11 Bonner, 1996, p. 126.
12 Mayr, 1982, p. 553.
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at a single locus were assumed to be associated with different traits in
the organism. This meant that the consequences for survival and
reproduction of an individual’s genetic makeup at one locus could be
considered separately from the consequences stemming from its makeup
at other loci.
Long after the Synthesis appeared complete, one of its leading con-
tributors, Ernst Mayr, expressed doubts regarding the role played in it
by population genetics (which by then had become an established field
of research). His qualms had nothing to do with the Mendelian–Bio-
metrician dispute. Instead, he worried that the models constructed by
population geneticists had been too simple-minded, that they had ig-
nored essential features of the link between genes and traits. Therefore,
he asserted, the findings that resulted were of little value for under-
standing evolution. The gist of his criticism was that the models treated
genes as independent carriers of hereditary traits, whereas in fact genes
functioned as interacting complexes, not as independent entities. In a
humorous analogy, Mayr drew an analogy between the population
genetics approach to explaining evolution and counting genes as if they
were differently coloured beans in a bag. J. B. S. Haldane, one of the
founders of population genetics, contested Mayr’s criticism forcefully in
a famous publication.13 The exchanges between Mayr and Haldane,
along with comments made at various times by other workers, consti-
tute what has come to be called the beanbag genetics dispute (or con-
troversy). The explicit part of the dispute pitted Haldane and Mayr on
opposite sides of an important question: Just what non-obvious insights
into evolution had come from the models of population genetics? There
is an implicit part to the dispute, which touches on a more fundamental
issue and remains unresolved. Namely, given the practical limitations of
population genetics models, can they continue to help us in under-
standing the enormously complex evolutionary process while remaining
compact and understandable?
The Protagonists
Ernst Mayr (1905–2005)
In the words of Walter Bock,
It is fortunate that Ernst Mayr has enjoyed such a long life, because
he had to fit at least four major careers into it – that of an avian
13 Haldane, 1964.
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systematist, an evolutionist, a historian of science, and a philoso-
pher of science. And he was successful in all of those careers, inside
and outside ornithology.14
Mayr began his career as an ornithologist in Germany, migrated to
the USA in 1931, achieved fame as an evolutionary biologist and, as
mentioned, was one of the principal contributors to the Evolutionary
Synthesis. He was instrumental in founding the journal ‘‘Evolution’’
which gave evolutionary studies a firm footing in biological research in
the USA. Along with contributions from G. G. Simpson, Th. Dobz-
hansky, G. L. Stebbins and others, Mayr’s field studies and analyses
made it appear that genetics and natural selection provided the most
plausible explanation for a range of features of life on earth including
biodiversity and the geographical distribution of plants and animals,
and, in general, evolutionary change. Further information, including a
full-length biography, can be found in the literature.15 Mayr wrote
prolifically and continued to develop his view of evolution through a
long life; ‘‘Animal Species and Evolution’’ is an acclaimed classic.16
J. B. S. Haldane (1892–1964)
Along with R. A. Fisher, Sewall Wright, and S. S. Chetverikov, J. B. S.
Haldane was one of the founders of the mathematical theory of evo-
lution, also known as population genetics. He is acknowledged as one of
the most erudite and prescient biologists of the twentieth century. He
was among the first to develop a mathematical theory of enzyme action
and to make the link between biochemistry and genetics. Haldane was
also a mathematician, Marxist, philosopher and superb populariser of
science. Together with his wife Helen Spurway, a distinguished geneti-
cist in her own right, Haldane migrated from Great Britain to India in
July 1957. Anti-Imperial sentiments were part of the reason for leaving.
In the beginning the two of them took up positions at the Indian Sta-
tistical Institute, Calcutta and worked there from July 1957 to May
1961. Thereafter Haldane established a research unit in Calcutta for just
over a year and later moved to Bhubaneshwar in Orissa where he died in
1964. Haldane revelled in controversy all his life. The Beanbag Genetics
dispute, one of the best known, took place during his Indian period.
14 Bock, 2004.
15 Bock, 2004; Haffer, 2007; Mayr, 1980; Provine, 2004; Wilkins, 2002.
16 Mayr, 1963.
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For more about Haldane, see the biographies by Clark17 and Dron-
amraju18 and shorter pieces by several writers.19 Haldane summarised
his view of the evolutionary process in 1932 in a classic of his own20 and
continued to make major contributions to evolutionary biology over the
rest of his life.
Haldane–Mayr Correspondence: (1) Before the Cold Spring Harbor
Symposium
Ernst Mayr remained ignorant of Haldane’s contributions for a sur-
prisingly long time: ‘‘People have often asked me what impact Fisher,
Haldane and Wright had on my thinking. My answer is quite embar-
rassing…I did not become aware of Haldane’s work until about
1947.’’21 We do not know when Haldane came to know of Mayr. The
two appear to have met for the first time in Princeton, New Jersey, in
1947 at an international conference held under the auspices of the US
National Research Council at which Sewall Wright was also a partici-
pant22; the ‘‘Princeton Conference’’ has become famous in the history of
the Evolutionary Synthesis.23 Their next meeting was in the summer of
1951. Being considered an enemy alien during the period of World War
II, Mayr had been unable to travel outside the USA and had to wait
until after he obtained US citizenship in December 1950.24 But now he
was going to be in Pavia, Italy, and wrote to Haldane on March 16,
1951:
Dear Haldane, I shall be in England in about the middle of May to
the early part of June, and I hope I will have an opportunity to see
you…I am planning to spend most of the spring and summer in
Europe, and it will start with a visit to Pavia where I will lecture to
Buzzati-Traverso’s department.25
17 Clark, 1968.
18 Dronamraju, 1985.
19 Maynard Smith, 1965; Wright, 1968; Crow, 1992; Nanjundiah, 1992; Bonner, 1998.
20 Haldane, 1932 and 1990.
21 Mayr, 1980, p. 421.
22 Ibid., p. 42.
23 Mayr and Provine, 1980 and 1998.
24 Haffer, 2007.
25 Letter dated 16 March 1951 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No. HUGFP,
14.7, BOX 8, F 384; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
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Haldane was happy to learn that Mayr was to be in the neighbourhood
and, in the summer of 1951 (surmised), extended a cordial invitation:
Dear Mayr, We shall of course be delighted if you can stay with us,
as Prof. Norbert Wiener has recently done. But it is only fair to
warn you that (1) Our flat is full of cats, and stinks vilely. (2) We
are apt to work till midnight, so you would have to look after
yourself to some extent… But bed and breakfast are yours for the
asking, and we would like to have you very much if only for a few
days. We have what may be a new idea about speciation, which I
will discuss…My wife joins me in hoping you will spend at least a
few nights with us (unless your FBI would object).26
The allusion to the FBI must be read in the context of Haldane’s
well-known Marxist sympathies. After Mayr had enjoyed the company
of the Haldanes in London, he wrote back on September 26, 1951: ‘‘I
had a most profitable time not only in England but also in various other
European countries, and I hope to derive benefit from the many stim-
ulating conversations for years to come.’’27 More letters passed back
and forth. In one, dated November 15, 1951, Mayr tells Haldane what
many others have felt before and since: ‘‘Yes, you are right that Darwin
was perhaps the biologist who made the greatest contribution to geol-
ogy. There is much in the ORIGIN OF SPECIES that is overlooked by
everyone, even though it is as valid today as it was then.’’28
There was a regular flow of letters between Haldane in the UK and
Mayr in the USA until 1956. Haldane and his wife Helen Spurway
moved to India in July 1957 and took up positions at the Indian Sta-
tistical Institute, Calcutta at the invitation of P. C. Mahalanobis, the
Director. In spite of their distance, Haldane and Mayr were in regular
touch, with Haldane discussing the research work in genetics being
carried out in his unit at the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) and each
using the other to try out their ideas. In one of his early letters to
Haldane after the move to India, Mayr vents his exasperation at all the
travelling he is doing (presumably because it was the centenary of the
26 Undated letter, inferred to be of 1951, from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr (No.
HUGFP, 14.7, BOX 9, F 406; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge,
MA, USA).
27 Letter dated 26 September 1951 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No.
HUGFP, 14.7, BOX 9, F 406; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge,
MA, USA).
28 Letter dated 15 November 1951 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No.
HUGFP, 14.7, BOX 10, F 428; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cam-
bridge, MA, USA).
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publication of ‘‘The Origin of Species’’), mentions that he plans to visit
him and, on April 13, 1959, highlights yet another instance he has come
across of the importance of gene interactions – something that was to
play an important role later in the beanbag genetics dispute:
…no one seems to give us poor evolutionists a chance to be lazy
and inert in this year 1959. Travelling from one evolution confer-
ence to the next, I feel like the old-time Vaudeville performer…I
shall celebrate the passing of this trying year by going to Australia
and if all goes well, I hope to pass through India on my way
home…I have long wanted to come to India where I have quite
good friends and I hope this will finally be possible. Not the least
reason will be to see you and Helen again…I recently…visited
Maynard Smith and discussed with him his selection experiments.
It is rather interesting to see how the interaction of genes becomes
the central problem wherever one checks what they do in some
genetic laboratory. I must say that University College didn’t seem
to be the same place without you and Helen.29
The Dispute Anticipated
The issues that were to underlie the beanbag genetics dispute cropped
up on at least two occasions before 1959. The geneticist and develop-
mental biologist C. H. Waddington voiced his reservations about
population genetics during a symposium organised in Oxford by the
Society for Experimental Biology in 1952 and repeated them in his book
‘‘The Strategy of the Genes.’’ Waddington began by conceding that over
the previous 30 years mathematical theorists and experimental natu-
ralists had made use of the viewpoint of genetics to mount a successful
attack on the problems posed by evolution and ‘‘may be taken to have
reached their goal.’’ But, looking deeper, he found that the mathe-
matical treatment ‘‘has not…led to any noteworthy quantitative state-
ments about evolution;’’ equally, ‘‘Very few qualitatively new ideas have
emerged from it.’’30 Haldane, who wrote the Foreword to the sympo-
sium volume, did not miss the chance to rebut Waddington. Picking up
a theme that he was to return to later, he pointed out that some of the
29 Letter dated 13 April 1959 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No. HUGFP,
74.7, BOX 6, F 731; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
30 Waddington, 1953.
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contributions of the mathematical theory had become so familiar that
their origins had been forgotten. The most obvious case involved the
disproof of a notion that had ‘‘a superficial appeal to common sense, for
example that dominants must oust recessives.’’ He went onto list others:
the conservation of variation (in the absence of mutation and selection)
and its slow loss in small populations, the maintenance of deleterious
genes in a state of balance in the face of adverse selection and the role of
heterozygote advantage in preserving genetic polymorphism.31
A symposium on the theme The Genetics of Population Structure was
organised by A. Buzzati-Traverso in Pavia in 1953 and was attended by
a galaxy of evolutionists including Fisher. The comments of two among
them illustrate our theme. Dobzhansky said that Mendel had been
fortunate in finding genes that segregated independently (i.e. were not
linked); otherwise, his results could have ‘‘confronted him with a
problem which he would have been unable to solve’’ – the discovery
would have been ‘‘premature.’’ Therefore, he concluded,
…it has been wise, I think, that most geneticists have occupied
themselves for almost half a century with studies on clear-cut,
discrete character differences produced by single or at most by few
genes…‘Bad’ mutants, which involved complex gene interactions or
which did not manifest themselves in all individuals which carried
them, were often observed but rarely studied since they were too
difficult to work with. However, ‘‘studies on traits produced by
interaction of numerous genes with individually small effects’’ were
beginning, and it was becoming appreciated that ‘‘variable genes in
the gene pool of a Mendelian population are often integrated in
complexes.’’32
I. M. Lerner based his remarks on those of Dobzhansky. Addressing
‘‘The Current Status of Population Genetics’’,33 he asserted that
…we face a crisis in this field…Yet the basis of most formal
analyses in population genetics today is still tied to what may be
called the gene frequency approach…Our current understanding of
genetics, however, leads some of us to consider, as noted by Do-
bzhansky, complexes rather than classical single genes as the sig-
nificant units, temporary as they may be, in evolutionary processes.
31 Haldane, 1953.
32 Dobzhansky, 1954.
33 Lerner, 1954.
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Lerner said there were ‘‘three areas which must be explored to give us
a clue as to where we are to go next.’’ The first was semantics, i.e.,
achieving a common understanding of the meanings of technical terms;
the next was ‘‘quantification of the processes dealing with changes in the
genetic compositions of populations;’’ and the third was a ‘‘synthesis
between formal and developmental analyses.’’ It is noteworthy that the
first item in Lerner’s list is at the heart of present-day arguments related
to our understanding of the evolutionary basis of social behaviour. His
third point of criticism, the absence of an explicit role for development
in population genetics models, was to be stressed repeatedly in the fu-
ture by Mayr and several others.
Mayr was a participant at the 1953 Pavia symposium but did not
speak. Haldane was there too; his task was to give the closing address.
He did so with gusto, evoking the greatness of Pavia and quoting lib-
erally from Lucretius and Dante (both of them forerunners of genetics,
he claimed) in the original. He regretted that ‘‘a piece of chicken bone
‘in questa gola’ [‘in this throat’] was removed with a skill’’ [that] ‘‘pre-
vented my mortal remains from joining those of Spallanzani and Scarpa
in your museum.’’ But in the course of entertaining his listeners Haldane
omitted to comment on the scientific proceedings, admitting ruefully, ‘‘I
fear that your great poets have led me astray, and that I have not said
what was expected of me.’’34
The dispute was anticipated again during the 1955 Cold Spring
Harbor Symposium, which was on the theme ‘‘Population Genetics:
The Nature and Causes of Genetic Variability in Populations.’’ Dobz-
hansky gave an introductory survey in which he stated that the time had
come for population genetics, which ‘‘was really launched in the thir-
ties,’’ to expand its scope and develop a more realistic and more com-
plex picture of the evolutionary process, albeit one that was ‘‘likely to
displease those who like single-minded solutions.’’35 Mayr took up the
thread in his concluding remarks and alluded to a new, inclusive pop-
ulation genetics that had not been fully developed yet.36 Ironically (in
view of what was to come later), Wright, who spoke in between, also
emphasised what Dobzhansky and Mayr were getting at. Population
geneticists knew they had to pay heed to it, he said: ‘‘Each gene
replacement inevitably has extremely ramifying pleiotropic conse-
quences.’’ Therefore ‘‘Evolution depends on the fitting together of
34 Haldane, 1954.
35 Dobzhansky, 1955.
36 Mayr, 1955.
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favorable complexes from genes that cannot be described as in them-
selves either favorable or unfavorable.’’37
Mayr Initiates the Dispute
The dispute proper began with Ernst Mayr’s inaugural talk at the 1959
Cold Spring Harbor Symposium on Quantitative Biology, held in the
Centenary year of the publication of ‘‘The Origin of Species.’’ The
theme was Genetics and Twentieth Century Darwinism; Mayr was also
one of its organisers. Appropriately for the anniversary that was being
celebrated, his presentation, entitled ‘Where are we,’ consisted of a
survey of the status of Darwinism in 1959.38 He mentioned early in the
talk that there was a major omission in Darwin’s theory, namely that it
left open the question of how variations arose and how they were
transmitted through heredity. It was well known that the first problem
was sufficiently difficult to have made Darwin take recourse to ideas
derived from Lamarck. As for inheritance, Mayr added, the work of
Mendel and his successors filled the gap and led to the establishment of
genetics as a science; the consequences for evolutionary biology were
profound. He took advantage of the opportunity provided by the
symposium to expand on the link between genetics and evolution and
began by identifying three distinct phases during the development of the
link.
The first phase, Mayr said, was inaugurated by Weismann’s work.
Weismann showed how implausible were the ideas of Lamarck, and
went to establish ‘‘a new intellectual climate for genetic thinking.’’ It
was this climate, according to Mayr, that made it possible for the sig-
nificance of Mendel’s findings to be appreciated after they were redis-
covered. Next he alluded to the confusion that had prevailed because of
the difference in the way the Mendelians and Biometricians (Darwinists)
saw evolution. The divergence was so vast that even T. H. Morgan had
been misled into thinking that evolution occurred because of ‘‘occa-
sional lucky mutations that happened to be helpful rather than harm-
ful.’’ In due course the two views were reconciled. Following the
reconciliation, he pointed out, two more phases followed that marked
the coming together of genetics and evolution. They were a phase of
‘‘classical population genetics’’ and one of the ‘‘newer population
genetics.’’ The classical period was also termed the beanbag period.
37 Wright, 1955.
38 Mayr, 1959.
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It was a period of ‘‘gross oversimplification,’’ because ‘‘Evolutionary
change was essentially presented as an input or output of genes, as the
adding of certain genes to a beanbag and the withdrawing of others.’’
This was the first use of the term ‘‘beanbag.’’39
The problem with this approach was its ‘emphasis on the frequency
of genes,’ with each gene being treated as if it was ‘‘an independent unit
favoured or discriminated against by various causal factors.’’ In con-
trast, the third period of Newer Population Genetics ‘‘was characterized
by an increasing emphasis on the interaction of genes,’’ to a mode of
thinking that he had earlier described as the ‘‘genetic theory of rela-
tivity’’ (a phrase that did not take hold). Mayr conceded that the con-
tribution of beanbag genetics was not to be totally disregarded. It was a
‘‘necessary step in the development of our thinking;’’ in fact ‘‘it restored
the prestige of natural selection.’’ After paying this compliment, Mayr
asked ‘‘But what, precisely, has been the contribution of this mathe-
matical school to the evolutionary theory, if I may be permitted to ask
such a provocative question?’’ He was alluding explicitly to the math-
ematical analysis and models of Fisher, Wright and Haldane. The ab-
sence of Chetverikov’s name – and more generally the work of the
Soviet school – from much of the English literature pertaining to early
population genetics is an example of how language and culture impinge
on science. Elsewhere, for instance in his epic The Growth of Biological
Thought, Mayr credited Chetverikov with being ‘‘way ahead of the
western group in his much clearer recognition of the evolutionary
importance of gene interaction.’’40
Haldane–Mayr Correspondence: (2) From Cold Spring Harbor
Symposium to ‘‘Animal Species and Evolution’’
The very first time Mayr used the term ‘beanbag’ appears to have been
during the Cold Spring Harbor Symposium in June 1959. He had
charged Haldane, Fisher and Wright with being ‘‘Beanbag Geneticists.’’
For more than one reason, Haldane may have not learnt of this; in any
case he did not react at the time. Haldane could not respond to Mayr’s
salvo at the 1959 Cold Spring Harbor Symposium on the spot because
the US government had ensured his non-attendance by denying him a
visa. He was excited in December 1959 at the imminent visit of Mayr to
Calcutta and tried to tempt Mayr with the advantages of staying with
39 Ibid.
40 Mayr, 1982, p. 558.
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him by chalking out an attractive itinerary. The visit would take in the
world-famous temples of Orissa with some bird watching thrown in;
besides that (Haldane to Mayr, 30 December 1959), ‘‘…There are no
strings on our invitation…. Of course if you like you can stay in Cal-
cutta hotel. Part of one fell down recently. …Our garden contains spi-
ders which weave webs whose threads are arranged in rectangles. I bet
they haven’t got such a web in the Zoological Survey!’’41
Mayr appears to have been the only visitor for whom Haldane
thought of chalking out such an elaborate programme. As planned, he
was the Haldanes’s houseguest in Calcutta and appears to have enjoyed
himself thoroughly in their company. Haldane’s regard for his visitor is
evident from a letter he wrote on 15 March 1960 to the Mayor of
Calcutta. While passing on Mayr’s letter of appreciation regarding the
Calcutta Zoological Gardens, he acquaints the Mayor with the eminent
status of his visitor: ‘‘I may remark that Prof. Mayr is generally
regarded as one of the three or four leading students of birds and ranks
very high as a systematic zoologist. He occupies the most famous chair
in the United States…’’42
All the signs are that the visit went off with Haldane remaining in the
dark about Mayr’s talk at that year’s Cold Spring Harbor Symposium;
as the 1953 Society for Experimental Biology volume shows, negative
comments on his work provoked a quick response. It is hard to imagine
him being so warm and hospitable towards a person who had just
termed him a ‘‘Beanbag Geneticist,’’ which strengthens the case for
believing that Mayr’s comments were yet to reach him.
In December 1960 Mayr came across an idea of Haldane’s that was
to loom large in the dispute. In a celebrated paper, among the earliest by
him to be published with an Indian address, Haldane had advanced the
notion that there would be a ‘cost’ of natural selection, also referred to
as a ‘‘genetic load’’43 (H. J. Muller developed the concept indepen-
dently). He was trying to draw an evolutionary lesson from a common
experience of breeders: selection for many desirable traits at the same
time was next to impossible (because it would be next to impossible to
maintain a sufficiently large breeding population generation after gen-
eration). The lesson was this: if evolution acted via substitutions, acting
41 Letter dated 30 December 1959 from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr (No. HUGFP,
74.7, BOX 6, F 731; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
42 Letter dated 15 March 1960 from J. B. S. Haldane to Mayor of Calcutta, India (No.
NLS, MS-20538, F 192–206; National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, UK).
43 Haldane, 1957.
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independently, of deleterious alleles by beneficial ones at a large number
of loci – that is, natural selection weeded out the deleterious alleles – and
if the population was not to crash, a cost would be demanded of the
fittest individuals by way of extraordinarily high fecundities.
Apart from testing out ideas on each other, the two of them regularly
exchanged published articles. On one such occasion, in the course of
writing on 2 January 1961 to thank Haldane for some reprints, Mayr
asked a question about the ‘cost.’ Would it not be significantly lowered
if there were strong interactions between the fitness effects of genes at
different loci? This was precisely the issue that others would raise later:
Your shipment of reprints reached me on Christmas eve and was my
Christmas present that I enjoyed the most…I am particularly glad
to have your paper on the cost of natural selection which I had of
course read soon after it had come out. I think it will form the basis
of a lot of future investigations…A second point that puzzles me is
the effect of synergistic versus antagonistic interactions of genes. In
view of the fact that no gene has an absolute selective factor, the
contribution of a gene to mortality may be greater when it is com-
bined with one or more other ‘bad’ genes than when it is combined
with fitness-increasing genes. As a result a single case of genetic
death may simultaneously eliminate several deleterious genes from
the population. Wouldn’t that change your calculations?44
Haldane’s reply of 11/12 January 1961 started by conceding that he
was in the process of coming to grips with the various ways in which
natural selection can exact a cost – some that need to be thought
through to this day, as it happens – and ended with a swipe at US visa
policy:
I am still thinking about the ‘cost of natural selection’ or the
‘substitutional load’…I have just, as you know, been awarded the
[US] National Academy’s Kimber Medal. I should like to come in
April and collect it. But when I last applied for a visa to your
country I was told to list all organisations of which I had been a
member since the age of 16, with dates of entering and leaving
them. I regret that I do not know in what year I joined the National
Mouse and Rat Club, to mention only one. And I think a scientist
should go thru the motions of telling the truth. So unless your new
44 Letter dated 2 January 1961 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No. HUGFP,
74.7, BOX 7, F 761; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
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State Department takes action, I fear I can’t come. But if every-
body had scruples of this kind, civilised life would be impossible.45
Mayr continued to plug away at conceptual issues associated with the
concept of ‘cost.’ He was going to raise them in a forthcoming book, he
wrote on February 21, 1961, evidently referring to ‘‘Animal Species and
Evolution’’:
I have prepared a first draft of a discussion on genetic load for my
forthcoming book and am enclosing it for criticism. Perhaps this
will make some of the questions in my last letter little clearer. The
relativity of fitness and the possible synergistical action of favorable
as well as deleterious genes is not sufficiently coped with in pub-
lished calculations. Our interest in questions of this sort is so recent
that we still lack the pertinent facts.46
Haldane’s response was that one had to be cautious about drawing
inferences from calculated ‘loads;’ he had made an estimate in the case
of Drosophila melanogaster and he and his colleagues in Calcutta were
trying to carry out a calculation involving humans (Haldane to Mayr, 3
March 1961):
If I were you I would perhaps make the point that a ‘load’ even of
50%may be slight if it occurs early enough in life. You nearly make
it on p.3. but not quite…If, say, lethals killed the same number
during pupation, this would be much ‘heavier.’ The inviable eggs
may even be eaten by their brothers and sisters, and inviable babies
by their mothers… Dronamraju… [and]…Meera Khan…now have
much better figures based on hospital patients who may be expected
to be rather inbred, and school children, who may be expected to be
rather outbred, 7.3% of all marriages are with nieces, 16.8% with
first cousins. I think, if we can get support for this work, we may be
able to estimate some loads. But it is less trouble to do a job of work
than to cadge for the cash. I haven’t thought much about loads
lately, as some broken bones have been troubling me.47
45 Letter dated 11/12 January 1961 from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr (No.
HUGFP, 74.7, BOX 7, F 761; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge,
MA, USA).
46 Letter dated 21 February 1961 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No. HUGFP,
74.7, BOX 7, F 761; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
47 Letter dated 3 March 1961 from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr (No. HUGFP,
74.7, BOX 7, F 761; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
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Mayr’s answer of 16 March 1961 showed that he would not let go of
a problem that – he thought – could undermine the idea itself:
Yes, the difference between early and late mortality is precisely the
one I was trying to make in my own comments, and this is why I
think that ‘cost of evolution’ is less severe than you suggest. If you
make the further assumption, which I think is not altogether
unreasonable, that various fitness-reducing factors are synergistic,
you may have quite an elimination of genes and genotypes without
any real threat to the survival of the population…
My main point really is that one must eventually go beyond the
preliminary stage of assuming that genes have constant and absolute
selective values, an assumptionwe all knownot to be realistic but into
whichwe are being forced by the simplifying value of the assumption.
My feeling is that by operating with ‘average selective values’ of
genes, we introduce quite unrealistic models into our calculations.48
For the moment this discussion petered out. Haldane, who had be-
come an Indian citizen in the meanwhile, offered advance regrets in a
letter of 19 April 1961 that he would be unable to collect the Kimber
Medal in person (Haldane to Mayr): ‘‘I am very sorry I shan’t be able to
get to Washington on April 24th…between the Indian and American
bureaucracies, I doubt if I could have got a visa. The Indian one has
taken nearly a year getting me Indian nationality.’’49
The ‘cost of natural selection’ hypothesis was to have a curious
consequence. Quantitatively-minded evolutionists showed later just
what Mayr had tried to do in the letters cited above (see notes 44–48).
Haldane’s calculation, though mathematically correct, had hinged on
the crucial assumption that selection acted independently at different
loci. It turned out that Haldane had been wrong in believing that the
result was general. With more plausible models, for example interactive
fitness effects or ‘truncation selection,’ the cost could be negligible or
non-existent.50 However, by taking Haldane’s result at face value,
Kimura drew an unexpected inference.51 Namely, it was unlikely that
48 Letter dated 16 March 1961 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No. HUGFP,
74.7, BOX 7, F 761; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
49 Letter dated 19 April 1961 from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr (No. HUGFP,
74.7, BOX 7, F 761; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
50 Maynard Smith, 1968; Ewens, 1993.
51 Kimura, 1968a.
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populations could carry alleles that lowered fitness at very many loci –
precisely because the cost of doing so would be impossibly high.
Therefore, he concluded, most mutations must be neutral. Thus the
neutral theory of molecular evolution, arguably the single most signif-
icant contribution of population genetics theory to our understanding
of the evolutionary process to come from the post-Synthesis period, was
based on a less than firm ‘beanbag genetics’ foundation.
Unhappy with the way the Indian Statistical Institute was being run,
Haldane and Helen Spurway resigned from it in the year 1961 and
established a ‘‘Genetics and Biometry Unit’’ under the auspices of the
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), initially at their
residence itself. Mayr was happy to learn about the move and, when he
wrote to Haldane at his new work place on 1 March 1962, made the first
mention of his book ‘‘Animal Species and Evolution’’:
I am delighted to see that you are well established at your new little
empire (or shouldn’t I use such a dirty word)…. I am glad that
news from Helen and you is so cheerful. There is such a pleasure in
doing straight forward research…I am most anxious to get back
into it after working for so many years on a book manuscript. The
book is now just about finished and has to be delivered to Harvard
University Press on April 15th. You won’t find much in it that is
new to you, but I have made a real effort to sort and present
systematically a vast amount of scattered information and theory
about species and about evolutionary phenomenon on the species
level. I hope, it will be considered for what it is, a progress report,
and that it will stimulate people to continue where I leave off. I am
always afraid that people might consider as final, what is one’s
provisional temporary conclusion.52
Things did not work out with CSIR either. The Haldanes made yet
another move by July 1962 and set up the ‘Genetics and Biometry Unit’
once again. This time it was at Bhubaneswar, with the help of the then
chief minister of Orissa, Biju Patnaik. Mayr wrote on 19 November
1962 when he learnt about the move and gave a hint of what was to
come:
I had not heard about your moving to Bhubaneswar until I re-
ceived your reprints…I still remember with great pleasure my
visit to Bhubaneswar under your guidance…I do hope you find
52 Letter dated 1 March 1962 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No. HUGFP,
74.7, BOX 8, F 790; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
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happiness in these auspicious surroundings. I have just completed
reading the galley proof of my Animal Species and Evolution and I
hope that it will be available by about April next spring. I am sure
you will find some things in it that will interest you and others with
which you will disagree…I wanted to get away from the atomistic
treatment of populations as samples of gene frequencies (inde-
pendent of each other so to speak), and I had to be careful not to
say anything that would suggest that I was in sympathy with
holistic or finalistic ideas which, of course, I am not. Well, you will
see in due time.53
Considering the adverse remarks that the book contained, it is
revealing that Mayr kept discussing it. In a letter of 25 February 1963 he
announced his intention to send a proof copy for review. Evidently he
was confident that Haldane would take scientific criticism in his stride:
I have managed to induce Harvard University Press to send you a
set of page proof of my Animal Species and Evolution. They
promised to send it by airmail and thus you will have a review copy
long before anyone in England or continental Europe. I have also
asked them to add proof of the bibliography, which should be
rather useful to your students. As you will notice, I have tried to
counteract the modern trend to forget all about the pioneers. In a
number of areas I have made a real effort to trace back ward, the
development of a concept to its earliest beginnings. I hope you and
Helen will enjoy reading the volume and will not find too many
things in it that you will have to disagree with.54
Mayr’s Comments in Animal Species and Evolution
The problem with the Mendelian viewpoint, Mayr reiterated in the
book,55 was that it restricted itself to a consideration of individual genes
and their relative numbers:
53 Letter dated 19 November 1962 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No.
HUGFP, 74.7, BOX 9, F 805; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge,
MA, USA).
54 Letter dated 25 February 1963 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No. HUGFP,
74.7, BOX 9, F 820; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA
55 Mayr, 1963.
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When dealing with several genes, the geneticist was inclined to
think in terms of their relative frequencies in the population. The
Mendelian was apt to compare the genetic contents of a population
to a bagful of colored beans. Mutation was the exchange of one
kind of bean for another. This conceptualization has been referred
to as ‘beanbag genetics’… Work in population and developmental
genetics has shown, however, that the thinking of beanbag genetics
is in many ways quite misleading. To consider genes as independent
units is meaningless from the physiological as well as the evolu-
tionary viewpoint. Genes not only act (with respect to certain as-
pects of the phenotype) but also interact. (p. 263)
The essence of speciation, as we now realize, is the production of
two well-integrated gene complexes from a single parental one. All
early attempts to explain the genetics of speciation missed this
essential point, being concerned entirely with the problem of the
origin of difference…It is now evident that there is only one situ-
ation in which a gene pool can be completely reconstituted genet-
ically (with reference to a parental population) while all of its
elements remain well integrated and co-adapted: spatial isola-
tion…Why isolation was needed remained a puzzle until the
genetics of integrated gene complexes had replaced the old ‘bean-
bag’ genetics. (p. 518)
And on p. 535:
The genetic revolution in peripherally isolated populations has
been interpreted, so far, in terms of ‘beanbag genetics,’ in terms of
shifts in gene frequencies. Such an interpretation is in distinct
contrast to the belief of many early cytogeneticists that speciation is
the result of a structural repatterning of chromosomes.
Mayr had enlarged the scope of his original complaint: besides its
other failings, beanbag genetics could not explain the appearance of a
new species, whether fuelled by spatial isolation (a means favoured by
Mayr) or by sudden chromosomal changes. He seems not to have
known that Haldane had said as much 30 years before56: ‘‘[speciation]
may take place as the result of the isolation of a small unrepresentative
group of the population…’’ (p. 102); and ‘‘…a successful evolutionary
step rendered a new type of organism possible, and the pressure of
natural selection was temporarily slackened …Another possible mode
56 Haldane, 1932 and 1990.
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of making rapid evolutionary jumps is by hybridisation…this may lead
to the immediate formation of a new species by allopolyploidy’’ (pp.
104–105). Mayr’s criticisms were repeated in print many years later,
with more detail, in the re-written version of the book Populations,
Species and Evolution,57 that was published after Haldane’s death.
Basically, Mayr was repeating a number of things that he and others
had been saying over the years. The phenotype, and so fitness, depended
on the genotype and its interactions with the environment. Therefore
models needed explicitly to incorporate the causal processes by which
phenotypes arose, in other words development. It was an oversimplifi-
cation to reduce the system to one of single gene effects. Not only was
the effect of a gene dependent on the action of other genes, the fitness
associated with the phenotype depended on other phenotypes. On top of
everything, the tools of population genetics were simply unable to tackle
the most important evolutionary problem of all, speciation – not to
mention the appearance of the higher orders. The views of Dobzhansky
and Lerner, quoted already, strongly influenced Mayr’s thinking. So did
the experimental demonstration by Mather of the complexities that
showed up in selection for (apparently) a single trait. He was especially
struck by a famous study58 on selection for changing the number of
bristles on the abdominal segments of Drosophila melanogaster. The
findings were striking. Many genes were involved in bristle develop-
ment; the ‘‘wild type’’ contained sufficient genetic variability to make it
possible to select for significant changes in both directions; and selection
led to completely unexpected consequences, among them being effects
on fertility, fecundity and survival. The implication was that even
straightforward directional selection for a simple trait involved a mul-
titude of genes and interactions with many other traits.59
Haldane–Mayr Correspondence: After ‘‘Animal Species and Evolution’’
A short break followed in the correspondence between Haldane and
Mayr. As seen, Mayr had reiterated his qualms about population
genetics theory in ‘‘Animal Species and Evolution.’’ It was when Hal-
dane was going through the page proofs of this book that he was forced
57 Mayr, 1970, pp. 156, 162, 183, 297, 367.
58 Mather and Harrison, 1949.
59 Mayr, 1963, pp. 285–287.
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to confront the full force of Mayr’s pejorative terming of Fisher, Wright
and himself as ‘Beanbag Geneticists.’ In addition to the proofs, Haldane
may have read Mayr’s Cold Spring Harbor Symposium talk by then
and, belatedly, felt the sting. This woke him up:
Thank you for the proofs, which I am reading.Whether people agree
with your conclusions or not, your book will be an invaluable guide
to the literature. As a ‘‘bean-bag geneticist,’’ I think your view of a
species may be a little too physiological and not historical enough.
No doubt the various genes (as regards frequency and location as
well as molecular pattern) have to fit together to form, if not an
adaptive peak in Wright’s sense, a range of such peaks, separated at
most times from other such ranges by deep ‘‘valleys’’. But on reading
you, I sometimes get the feeling that you think we could calculate the
species if we knew enough about the genes. My guess is that existing
species are only a small fraction of those which might have been
made up with the genes available in a genus or family, and that the
reasons why we have just these species are largely historical.
Haldane continues,
As will be seen from p. 400 of the enclosed, I think your definition
of a species, though not your description of it, is a little too
futuristic for my taste. I tried to develop the philosophical side of
my view of species, in an article called ‘Differences’ (Mind, LVII N.
S. July, 1948, pp. 294–301), but I have no offprints left.60
As he had done before in his book,61 Haldane is saying here that
besides isolation and adaptation, the formation of a new species might
involve contingent (‘‘historical’’) factors; his view of evolution was not
restricted to natural selection.62 Now Haldane the scientist made way
for Haldane the friend: ‘‘We are within about 1 km of the area where
you saw larks and other birds when you were here. Perhaps you will
come again. But you might find us unhospitable during day light.’’ The
next letter, on 8 May 1963, elaborated on the theme:
60 Letter dated 6 April 1963 from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr (No. HUGFP, 74.7,
BOX 9, F 820; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA, USA).
61 Haldane, 1932 and 1990, pp. 104–105.
62 For example: ‘‘…where natural selection slackens, new forms may arise which
would not survive under more rigid competition, [leading to the appearance of] many
ultimately hardy combinations;’’ and ‘‘Another possible mode of making rapid evolu-
tionary jumps is by hybridisation’’ (Haldane, 1932).
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I am an unrepentant ‘beanbag geneticist’. Non-mathematicians
often fail to realise the complexity of behaviour and sometimes the
self-regulatory capacity of material systems composed of simple
components…Newton thought the creator had put the beans (Sun,
planets, and satellites) in the bag and given it a shake. But he
thought the system would lose its regularity, and after a few
thousand years the creator would have to give it another push.
Laplace showed that it would continue for at least 100,000 years, (a
very long time in those days) and therefore informed Napoleon that
he had no need of the hypothesis of super-natural interference. We
still don’t if it is stable for periods over 10 years, probably because
we aren’t sure enough about relativistic corrections. I have got back
to beanbag genetics in a big way, largely because I have got a
colleague, Jayakar, who can correct my algebra. We find that there
are a whole lot of conditions other than superiority of heterozy-
gotes which will conserve polymorphism on a reasonable scale.
30 years ago, I showed that mutation would not, unless selective
differentials were as small as mutation rates, but that migration
might do so. We can now give the conditions as to migration rather
more concretely.
The theory, which we are working out, of just what happens when
an initially ‘unfavoured’ genotype gradually increases its selective
value, is very tricky. It seems that the population may change ra-
ther suddenly, even if the relative fitness is only increasing slowly,
and the selection of ‘modifiers’ may make this change still more
sudden. (At this place a marginal note by Mayr reads ‘no longer
bean-bag!’). Unfortunately even when selection is weak we need
Bessel functions, which occur in the theory of vibration of drums.
But we are beginning to see what may happen when climatic
conditions change slowly. We have just worked out a fairly com-
prehensive theory of what happens under selection of constant
intensity when this is fairly strong (as it doubtless is when a new
niche is occupied and there is no immigration from the old one).
For this we need automorphic functions of a kind which were
fashionable in France about 1920. I may of course be hopelessly
out-of date in my approach. I am sure bright boys like Jim Crow
think so. But it seems to me that mathematical genetics are still
about the stage of s = ½ ft2…and that the mathematicians who
come in from time to time are interested in inessentials, or shall we
say, topics whose biological importance is not obvious. If I could
VEENA RAO AND VIDYANAND NANJUNDIAH
have devoted my life to the mathematical theory of evolution, I
might by now be able to tell you a little more about populations.
But I have so much else to do, even as a mathematician.63
Haldane’s advance copy of ‘‘Animal Species and Evolution’’ arrived
with a fulsome handwritten dedication from Mayr:
At the time that he received the book in Bhubaneshwar, he may have
been suffering from the colorectal cancer of which he was to die next
year. There was a regular exchange of friendly letters between the two of
them during this period, but Haldane was simultaneously preparing to
attack Mayr. He thought he was writing on behalf of the triumvirate
(not knowing, perhaps, that Wright had answered Mayr in 1960; Fisher
had died in 1960). This time, on 3 June 1963, his stand reflects an ‘attack
is the best form of defense’ attitude:
I have also completed a much more serious attack on you, entitled
‘A defense of beanbag genetics’. This is intended for ‘Perspectives
in biology and medicine’. I may say that from defense I pass to
counter-attack’’. In even-tempered language he continues ‘‘How-
ever I am going to get it typed, and then look at it again after three
months or so, to see if I find any sections of it unclear or unfair or
whether perhaps some new arguments have occurred to me. Here is
an example of a counter-attack. On p. 191 of ‘Animal Species and
Evolution’ you suggest that I did not believe in strong selection till
1957. In 1924 (Trans. Camb. Phil. Soc, recently reprinted by
63 Letter dated 8 May 1963 from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr (No. HUGFP, 74.7,
BOX 9, F 820; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA, USA).
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Comstock and Robinson of N. Carolina) I calculated that the
mutant Carbonaria of Bisten betularia [sic] conferred an advantage
of about 50%. This was beanbag genetics, and nobody took it
seriously for 30 years.’’
Haldane goes on,
I may conceivably be in U.S.A. in October. Some of the N.A.S.A.
boys have asked me, but I doubt if I shall get a visa. If I am there, I
might be able to see you. But it is easier for you to get here. My
house is about 1 km from the place where you saw the larks in the
early morning.64
Scientific disagreement did not come in the way of their friendship.
Mayr valued this equally, and in the course of commenting on Hal-
dane’s ‘Origin of Lactation’ paper, goes onto tell Haldane on 18 June
1963 that he is prepared to receive his response on the beanbag genetics
issue:
I shall receive your ‘attack’ on me philosophically. In a big volume
like the one I have written, it is quite impossible to avoid short-cuts
and generalizations. For instance, I had your 1924 paper in an
earlier draft, but took it out since you refer to it in your later
papers, and I had to streamline my over-long bibliography. I
wonder whether other readers would also come to the conclusion
that ‘I suggest that you did not believe in strong selection until
1957’ The whole point I tried to make was that around 1930, the
emphasis was on effect of slight differences in selection pressure and
that this led many non-geneticists into making unrealistic
assumptions.65
Haldane’s ‘‘Defense’’
Haldane gave a spirited reply to Mayr’s provocations in a publication
entitled A Defense of Beanbag Genetics.66 As far as the two of them were
concerned, the public controversy ended there. An obvious question is
why it came so late. As we have suggested, the answer may be that
64 Letter dated 3 June 1963 from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr (No. HUGFP, 74.7,
BOX 10, F 836; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA, USA).
65 Letter dated 18 June 1963 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No HUGFP, 74.7,
BOX 10, F 836; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA, USA).
66 Haldane, 1964.
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Haldane had not read the Cold Spring Harbor Symposium volume
when it came out and was simply not aware of Mayr’s comments of
1959. Because of a lack of up-to-date library facilities at the Indian
Statistical Institute, Haldane seems to have been ignorant of Wright’s
1960 response in the American Journal of Human Genetics
too (see next section). Oddly, none of his friends would appear to
have passed on Mayr’s negative assessment of population genetics to
him, either in correspondence or in person. Based on the evidence
available, the impression is that he first got to know of Mayr’s attack in
1963, when Mayr himself sent a page proof copy of Animal Species and
Evolution with a view to getting it reviewed.
Haldane begins with an introduction to the ‘beanbag approach’; even
though he uses the word Defense in the title, his style is anything but
defensive. He starts out disarmingly, by appearing to agree with Mayr,
and goes to the extent of denying that ‘the mathematical theory of
population genetics is anything at all impressive, at least to a mathe-
matician.’ As an example, he cites the large number of simplifying
assumptions used in very early work and points out that even with those
assumptions, the mathematical difficulties were huge. Solutions could be
found in certain limiting cases only: ‘If we had solved such problems,
our work would be impressive.’ He adds that professional mathemati-
cians who have ‘interested themselves in such matters…have been sin-
gularly unhelpful (because they have been concerned more with formal
issues, such as proving that a solution exists).’ Haldane’s message is that
while formulating scientific problems in mathematical language, one
should be careful not to get diverted by the mathematics. The important
thing is to work out useful solutions and avoid getting entangled by
purely mathematical issues. Others have pointed out67 that Haldane’s
attitude to the use of mathematics in biology was essentially utilitarian,
which is not to say that he did not enjoy doing mathematics for its own
sake. This part of the article ends by invoking classical precedents for
the formulation of the beanbag genetics concept – just as he had done a
decade earlier in the Pavia meeting.68 He begins with descriptions of a
possible material basis of heredity:
Now let me try to show that what little we have done is of some use,
even if we have done a good deal less serious mathematics than
Mayr believes. It may be well to cite the first formulation
67 Crow, 1992; Maynard Smith, 1992.
68 Haldane, 1954.
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of beanbag genetics. This was by the great Roman poet Titus
Lucretius Carus, just over 2000 years ago… A free rendering is:
‘since parents often hide in their bodies many genes mixed in many
ways, which fathers hand down to fathers from their ancestry; from
them Venus produces patterns by varying chance, and brings back
the faces, voices, and hair of ancestors’. Very probably, the great
materialistic (but not atheistic) philosopher Epicurus had expressed
the theory more exactly, if less poetically, in one of his last book-
s…What is important is that whether he called them primordia or
even seeds, he always thought of them as a set of separable material
bodies.
Next, Haldane points out that Mendel and his successors discovered
quantitative regularities in the way the material entities behaved, which
made it possible to develop a science of heredity: ‘‘When Mendel dis-
covered most of the laws according to which Venus picks out the hidden
genes from the mixture, and Bateson and Punnett further discovered
linkage, we could get going; and it was Punnett (5) who first calculated
the long-term effect of a very simple program of selection.’’
The second part starts with ‘‘Now let me begin boasting’’ and carries
onto say ‘‘So competent a biologist as Professor L. T. Hogben (6) has
recently written, ‘The mutation of chromosomes or of single genes is
admittedly the pace-maker of evolution.’ A strong verbal argument
could be made out for this statement.’’ Haldane continues his reply
thus: ‘‘The estimation of human mutation rates, which is a by-product
of my mathematical work, has since assumed some political importance.
Had I devoted my life to research and propaganda in this field, rather
than to expanding the bounds of human knowledge, I should doubtless
be a world-famous ‘expert.’’’
He goes onto enumerate some of the successes of classical population
genetics that were achieved thanks to the ‘‘beanbag’’ approach. The list
includes the following. (i) What determines the rate of evolution? A
naı¨ve analysis might tell us that it could be the rate of mutation, pre-
cisely because it is so much smaller than any other rate that one can
imagine as being relevant (e.g. genetic exchange or reproduction). Thus
mutation would seem to act as the ‘‘pacemaker’’ of evolutionary
change. Mathematical analysis confounds this expectation: it shows that
the rate of evolution depends strongly on the population size and the
strength of natural selection. In fact, for sufficiently large populations,
the rate at which a favourable gene spreads is determined essentially
by the strength of selection. By applying his theory to the celebrated
case of industrial melanism, Haldane showed that when the pressure of
VEENA RAO AND VIDYANAND NANJUNDIAH
selection was intense, evolution could occur far more rapidly than most
would have thought possible.
There was to be a posthumous final shot at Mayr. Haldane and S. D.
Jayakar (writing independently, and, interestingly, in Haldanian style)
reviewed ‘‘Animal Species and Evolution’’ in Journal of Genetics,69 as
did Helen Spurway, for the Journal of Bombay Natural History Soci-
ety.70 Haldane started off by calling it ‘‘the best book of its
kind…indispensable to any animal biologist…for the extremely stimu-
lating ideas to be found in every chapter,’’ though ‘‘Mayr’s arguments
have not convinced me that sympatric speciation has never occurred,
though I think he has demonstrated its rarity.’’ When it came to pop-
ulation genetics, the language was forthright: ‘‘Mayr seems to me
greatly to overestimate the simplicity of this subject…I have attempted
elsewhere (Haldane, 1964) to defend beanbag genetics. I think Mayr has
failed to grasp the extreme complexity of the results which are possible if
one starts from simple probabilistic axioms.’’
Wright’s Response to Mayr
Contrary to Haldane’s belief, Sewall Wright had in fact responded to
Mayr. Wright was one of the participants in the 1959 Cold Spring
Harbor Symposium and even chaired a session. Strangely, he did not
make a presentation. But he seized the opportunity to present his side
the very next year in a long review of the Symposium volume in the
American Journal of Human Genetics.71 Not surprisingly, he had a lot to
say about the Where Are We article, and its gist was that Mayr had got
it all wrong. First, in discussing lines of research in population genetics
since 1900, he ‘‘had seriously misrepresented the roles of these various
lines as well as the contributions of the one with which I am most
familiar;’’ his own ‘‘recollections of the attitudes of naturalists and
geneticists [during the Mendelian period] towards natural selec-
tion…differ considerably from Mayr’s statement.’’ Referring to
‘‘beanbag genetics,’’ Wright continued: ‘‘To demonstrate that progress
by selection is restricted to the net effects of genes in the combinations in
which they enter is not to ignore interaction as Mayr seems to suppose;’’
if anything, ‘‘the treatment of interaction systems was the central theme
of most of the ‘classical’ population genetics.’’ In effect, Mayr and
69 Haldane, 1965 and Jayakar, 1965.
70 Spurway, 1965.
71 Wright, 1960.
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Wright agreed that gene interactions existed and could not be neglected.
But whereas Mayr drew the further inference that the interactions were
so strong that they made any discussion of single-gene effects inconse-
quential, Wright pointed out that treating genes singly was not the same
as ignoring the effects of other genes. An extreme version of the single
gene view is associated with Fisher rather than Wright or Haldane. It
holds that the evolutionary history of most sexually reproducing
organisms has been so long that there has been sufficient time for
recombination to throw up an enormous number of genotypes. Every
gene has been put to the test in essentially every possible genetic
background. Therefore, it is meaningful to consider the (averaged)
effects of single genes and build on them.72
Wright hammered home his rebuttal of Mayr in a survey of the
foundations of population genetics73 and continued to do so over the
next two decades.74 Later, Mayr acknowledged that he had been less
than fair to Wright. He confessed to Provine75 that he had not made a
careful study of the articles or books by Haldane, Fisher or Wright
when he first attacked their work: ‘‘He was being controversial, to
promote ‘better science.’’’ In the same interview to Provine, given in
1986, Mayr revealed that he too had been a ‘‘beanbagger’’ in 1942, and
regretted having classified Wright as one. Wright had a background in
experimental genetics, was familiar with correlations between gene ef-
fects and polygenic inheritance, and had enjoyed a long and fruitful
collaboration with Dobzhansky on modelling the evolutionary conse-
quences of genetic variation in natural populations. Considering all
that, the lack of a proper appreciation of Wright’s way of looking at
evolution remains a puzzling omission on Mayr’s part.76
Haldane–Mayr Correspondence: Final Letters
The subsequent correspondence mainly involved ongoing research until
Mayr learnt of Haldane’s colon cancer. Haldane had dashed off a
72 Fisher, 1930 and 1958.
73 Wright, 1967.
74 Provine, 1986.
75 Provine, 2004.
76 On the other hand a reviewer of this paper pointed out that given the less than
smooth course of Mayr’s previous interactions with Wright, the omission is not all that
puzzling.
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humorous poem about it (‘‘Cancer’s a Funny Thing;’’ see http://
www.oatridge.co.uk/Haldane.htm). Mayr’s reaction was sent on 20
April 1964:
I got hold of your ‘ode on cancer,’ which amused me with its
Shavian sense of humour. I do hope that you are not too uncom-
fortable…I hope to pass through London this coming July, and
will be very much looking forward to seeing you then, if you should
still be in England.77
Haldane was feeling homesick and wanted to get back to India after
his surgery. In his reply dated 2 May 1964 he showed that he had
retained both his sense of humour and his spirit: ‘‘I am pretty well
alright, except that my colostomy has not learned to cope with the diet
here in a regular manner. This means that I can’t yet travel around
much, a very great advantage if one wants to work, as I do.’’ He con-
tinued with details of the work being done by Helen Spurway and
Jayakar on birds. But ‘beanbag’ was not forgotten:
Of course, we do plenty besides bird watching. I do beanbag
genetics…I learn from the local press that I have been elected to the
[US] National Academy…The election can be explained on several
grounds, e.g. 1) They thought I was dying of cancer, and wished to
solace my last moments 2) …After your remarks, the beanbaggers
felt something must be done. And so, one might go on… But I now
think it would be better to recognise younger men than myself.78
By now ‘A Defense of Beanbag Genetics’ had been accepted for
publication by ‘Perspectives in Biology and Medicine’ and may even
have appeared in print; the issue is dated ‘Spring 1964.’ The editor
enquired if Mayr would like to respond; he was disinclined to do so.
Instead, he offered Haldane an olive branch when he wrote on 3 June
1964:
The editor of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine has asked me to
respond to your statement on beanbag genetics, but I am not sure
that I will do so. Obviously, most of what you say will be fully
77 Letter dated 20 April 1964 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No. HUGFP 74.7,
BOX 11, F 852; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA, USA).
78 Letter dated 2 May 1964 from J. B. S. Haldane to Ernst Mayr. (No. HUGFP 74.7,
BOX 11, F 852; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA, USA).
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endorsed by me also. It is all a matter of emphasis. A certain
amount of beanbag genetics is the necessary basis for all else, but
on the whole, beanbag genetics is singularly unsuitable to explain
any but the most elementary evolutionary phenomena. Penetrance,
as you rightly remark in your letter, is a case in point. The recent
models developed by Jacob and Monod, and others, about regu-
lating genes are further substantiating arguments. The enormous
increase in the amount of DNA among eucaryotes, most of it
apparently not used for structural but for regulating genes, is still
further evidence. It is no use to argue about trivia, but I still believe
that beanbag genetics in many cases had a detrimental rather than
beneficial influence on evolutionary thinking. You, yourself, with-
out using such terminology, have called attention to this in many of
your papers.
Mayr went on to heap praises in what seems to have been his last letter
to Haldane:
I realize that your election to the National Academy is not an
honor to you but a removal of a disgrace from us…I do not know
whether this will please you or not, but I can assure you that you
have been for years the leading candidate of the biologists. It has
been a great source of satisfaction for all of us that your election
was finally ratified. Hence even if the election should not mean a
thing to you, I can assure you that it means a lot to us.79
When he wrote next Haldane requested Mayr not to write directly to
him anymore, as he was getting rather weak, and pointed out some
features of Spurway and Jayakar’s field work. In Mayr’s response of 21
October 1964, which was addressed to Helen Spurway, he referred to
Haldane as a polymath:
I still remember the Pavia meeting, not because Haldane almost
choked with a chicken bone in his throat or because of his
incredible virtuosity with verses from Dante’s Commedia Divina,
but because Haldane was the only one of the older geneticists
present, who fully appreciated what the younger ones were talking
about. R. A. Fisher disappointed me at the time by simply resisting
the new ideas. Haldane accepted them at once (so far as they were
sound) and asked meaningful questions as to where to go from
here. This flexibility of his mind, no doubt is the reason for his
79 Letter dated 3 June 1964 from Ernst Mayr to J. B. S. Haldane (No. HUGFP 74.7,
BOX 11, F 852; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA, USA).
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many original ideas. His 1957 paper on the cost of natural selection
is another documentation of his originality.80
J. B. S. Haldane died in Bhubaneshwar on 1 December 1964. It will
please readers of this journal to know that Mayr wrote the following
words to Helen Spurway 4 years later, on February 14, 1968: ‘‘I am so
glad you are looking after the Haldane papers. There is a rapidly
increasing interest in the history of recent biology…We just founded a
new Journal for the History of Biology….’’81
Later Assessments
The beanbag genetics controversy has not died down – an indication
that the dispute had as much to do with semantics as with differences
concerning assumptions or inferences, just as Lerner thought.82 The
mathematical geneticist W. J. Ewens delivered a lecture entitled
‘‘Beanbag Genetics and After’’ on the occasion of birth centenary of
J. B. S. Haldane at Calcutta in 1992 (in it he mistakenly dates the birth
of the term ‘bean bag genetics’ to 1963). Ewens agreed with Mayr and
felt that Haldane had responded to a non-issue, Mayr’s main point
being quite different. He gave a number of technical reasons for saying
why the assumptions made by Haldane were wrong and implied that
Haldane’s attempt to defend beanbag genetics was a failure,83 going so
far as to refer to The Cost of Natural Selection84 and More Precise
Expressions For the Cost of Natural Selection85 as the ‘two most
unfortunate papers ever written’ by Haldane.
Ironically, Mayr had overcome his earlier reservations regarding the
first of those papers sufficiently to express strong appreciation when he
wrote to Helen Spurway during Haldane’s final illness (compare letters
of early 1961, footnotes 44–48, and letter of 1964, footnote 80). How-
ever, Mayr is also said to have been ecstatic when he learnt of Ewens’s
80 Letter dated 21 October 1964 from Ernst Mayr to Helen Spurway (No. HUGFP
74.7, BOX 11, F 852; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
81 Letter dated 14 February 1968 from Ernst Mayr to Helen Spurway (No. HUGFP
74.7, BOX 15, F 956; Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA,
USA).
82 Lerner, 1954.
83 Ewens, 1993.
84 Haldane, 1957.
85 Haldane, 1961.
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criticism: ‘‘For Mayr, the theoretical population geneticists were finally
coming around to his perspective although this was hardly what Ewens
had intended.’’86 To make matters more puzzling, Mayr changed tack
once again in a favourable review that he wrote of a re-publication of
Haldane’s 1932 classic The causes of evolution: ‘‘Haldane realised that it
could lead to deceiving conclusions if one looked at each gene in iso-
lation, because this would fail to reveal synergistic and epistatic inter-
actions.’’87 As with Mayr’s change of opinion with regard to Wright’s
contributions to evolutionary theory, it is not obvious whether this
vacillation too should be attributed to an insufficient acquaintance with
the literature, or to a lack of confidence in his original stand. Provine88
discusses the point; Crow89 hints at the first of the above two expla-
nations in his appraisal of the beanbag genetics dispute: ‘‘Mayr was,
however, criticising textbook simplifications, rather than the actual
work of the three pioneers.’’ Or, as Smocovitis writes90 in a review of
Mayr’s last book, is it that he couldn’t quite come to grips with Haldane
who, unlike Fisher, did not feel called upon to remain constrained to a
single, ‘dominant’ view of evolution (‘‘…wasn’t ever quite sure what [to]
do with the overly polymathic Haldane’’)?
Walter Bock (personal communication to V. R., 16 May 2006) feels
that the misunderstanding arose because population geneticists had
made use of genes
that were completely dominant or recessive, had little to no environ-
mental input into the development of the phenotype, and no interac-
tion with other genes in producing the phenotype or in the selective
value of the gene. They failed to realise that the genes they used had
these characteristics and that not all genes had such characteristics.
The gloomiest possible appraisal of population genetics must be that
of Provine, as given in the Afterword to the re-issue of his history of the
field: ‘‘Now I see these theoretical models of the early 1930s, still widely
used today, as an impediment to understanding evolutionary biol-
ogy…’’ This negative assessment extended to the evolutionary synthesis
itself, which in his later opinion of 2001 was a ‘‘systematic diminution of
the factors in evolution,…[an] evolutionary constriction.’’91 In contrast,
86 Sarkar, 2005.
87 Mayr, 1992.
88 Provine, 2004.
89 Crow, 2009.
90 Smocovitis, 2005.
91 Provine, 1971 and 2001, p. 203.
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just 3 years before, in the 1998 paperback edition of The Evolutionary
Synthesis, Provine had called it ‘‘unquestionably an event of first-rank
importance in the history of biology’’ and thought it was ‘‘more basic to
the rise of modern biology’’ than ‘‘the revolution in molecular biology
or socio-biology.’’92
Not surprisingly, Kimura’s view93 supported Haldane:
Haldane’s works up to this stage are summarized in his book The
Causes of Evolution, published in 1932, and together with contri-
butions made R. A. Fisher (1930) and S. Wright (1931) in this
period, may be truly called classical. Despite the simplifying
assumptions they contain, they should be the basis for any future
development in the theory of population and evolutionary genetics.
No serious student in the field can work successfully without
studying them. It is regrettable therefore, that in recent years, a
tendency has developed, especially in the United States, among the
naturalistic workers on evolution to deprecate these classical works
as ‘bean bag genetics,’ without supplying adequate models for
quantitative treatments. As mathematical education becomes
widespread among biology students, it is hoped that these classical
works will receive greater appreciation.
Lewontin’s writings over the years deserve special attention for their
nuanced comments on the place of mathematics in evolutionary biol-
ogy. He said in 1974 that population genetics had ‘‘contributed little to
our understanding of speciation and nothing to our understanding of
extinction.’’94 This state of affairs was attributed to (among various
reasons) a lack of sufficiently accurate measurements of the parameters
that went into the theory, and the ignoring of interactions between genes
at different loci. More generally, he said, the problem was ‘‘the ban-
ishing of history’’95 – meaning a preoccupation, on the whole, with
equilibrium rather than change (though to say so without many quali-
fications would be clearly unfair in the case of Haldane). A more
positive assessment is found in his essay Theoretical Population Genetics
in the Evolutionary Synthesis,96 which contains fascinating exchanges
with Dobzhansky and Mayr. Lewontin alludes to Dobzhansky’s own
92 Mayr and Provine, 1980 and 1998, p. 392.
93 Kimura, 1968b, p. 135.
94 Lewontin, 1974, p. 12.
95 Ibid., pp. 267–271.
96 Lewontin, in Mayr and Provine, 1980 and 1998.
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example to show how ‘‘theoretical work can directly inform experi-
mental work’’ and reminds him that the relevant theory depended
essentially on the inputs of Wright. He expands on ‘‘the use of all of this
mathematical theory’’ as being an attempt to construct the logical
relations that arise from various assumptions about the world. ‘‘It is an
‘as if’ set of conditional statements.’’97 To Mayr’s assertion that ‘‘for the
purposes of the evolutionary biologists these very advanced theoretical
analyses were superfluous,’’ Lewontin’s response is unequivocal:
‘‘I really disagree….We can use the products of the mathematical
machinery to help us decide whether our experiments tell us what we
want to know…’’98
De Winter thinks that the origin of the beanbag dispute can be traced
to a ‘‘misinterpretation of the conceptual foundations’’ of population
genetics theory on the part of Mayr, in particular of the theory as
formulated by Fisher. One aspect of the misinterpretation was that
Mayr took a term used by Fisher, namely ‘‘average effect,’’ too literally.
Fisher meant that in order to compute the effect of an allele on fitness,
one had to examine the consequences of the allele’s presence in all
possible genetic backgrounds. According to De Winter, instead of that,
Mayr took Fisher to mean that an allele always had the same effect, the
‘‘average effect:’’ Mayr confused an ‘‘underlying quantum theory of
genic inheritance with a presumed functional quantum theory of genic
interaction.’’99 Wright had made the same point much earlier in dif-
ferent words.100 While supporting Haldane, Borges too draws attention
to how Mayr’s criticisms were off the mark.101
Crow praises the contributions of the beanbag geneticists in an article
titled ‘‘The beanbag lives on’’ and comments: ‘‘Gene pool models are
indeed simplified.’’ Using the economist Herbert Simon’s words, he goes
onto add, ‘‘…this is ‘meaningful simplicity’ that sweeps away ‘disorderly
complexity.’ Often it is such a simplified view that provides the most
useful insights into evolutionary processes …especially dynamic as-
pects.’’102 Whether significant advances have followed the initial at-
tempts and the initial successes of population genetics is another issue
altogether.
97 Ibid., pp. 64–65.
98 Ibid., pp. 67–68.
99 De Winter, 1997.
100 Wright, 1960.
101 Borges, 2008.
102 Crow, 2001.
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Backdrops
While the different views on population genetics were being aired, sig-
nificant changes were occurring in biology, the most momentous being
the molecular revolution. The rise of molecular biology was a major
backdrop to the beanbag genetics dispute, as was a continuing (and still
unresolved) debate on the role of mathematics in biology. We offer brief
comments on both.
The growing prestige of molecular biology and the sense of confi-
dence among its practitioners had become contentious issues (for other
biologists) by the late 1950s; the degree of self-confidence has been
referred to as ‘‘imperialistic zeal.’’103 Evolutionary biologists took
strong objection to the extreme reductionism espoused by molecular
biologists and to what was perceived as the implied threat to the exis-
tence of their own fields: ‘‘As research in molecular biology and bio-
chemistry intensified, the links between physicists and chemists and
biologists solidified further. With the articulation and refinement of the
molecular basis for genetic change, biology faced its greatest threat of
complete engulfment by the physical sciences.’’104 Vigorous counter-
attacks were mounted in response, with Mayr, Dobzhansky and
Simpson, all prominent architects of the evolutionary synthesis,
sounding warning notes. In the same address in which he initiated the
beanbag genetics dispute,105 Mayr, after saying ‘‘We live in an age that
places great value on molecular biology,’’ balanced it with ‘‘The very
survival of man on this globe may depend on a correct understanding of
evolutionary forces.’’ Dobzhansky put it thus: ‘‘In molecular biology,
one spectacular discovery has followed closely on the heels of another.
Molecular biology has become a glamor field…Glamor and brilliance
generate enthusiasm and optimism; they may also dazzle and blind-
fold.’’106 The complexity of living systems, their hierarchical organisa-
tion and historical antecedents were invoked; a distinction between
ultimate (=evolutionary) and proximate (=physiological, molecular-
biological) explanations was drawn. Even so, Mayr did not hesitate to
make use of the findings of Jacob and Monod to buttress his cam-
paign.107 His 1970 book108 contained the words: ‘‘The day will come
103 Dietrich, 1998.
104 Smocovitis, 1992.
105 Mayr, 1959.
106 Dobzhansky, 1964.
107 Mayr, 1963; also see footnote 79.
108 Mayr, 1970, p. 183.
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when much of population genetics will have to be rewritten in terms of
the interaction between regulator and structural genes. This will be one
more nail in the coffin of beanbag genetics. It will lead to a strong
reinforcement of the concept that the genotype of the individual is a
whole and that the genes of a gene pool form a unit.’’
Matters came to a head when the methods of biochemistry and
molecular biology were used to analyse DNA and protein sequences and
draw inferences regarding phylogeny and rates of evolution. There was
even talk of non-Darwinian evolution.109 Some of the conclusions
appeared strange, even absurd, to classically minded evolutionists. The
existence of the ‘‘molecular clock’’ posed a major puzzle, because it
seemed to imply that protein evolution went on at a constant rate that
differed from one protein to another, and that it had nothing to do with
evolution in the conventional sense (that is, of the organisms that housed
the proteins). It took time before the realisation dawned that the word
‘evolution’ was indeed being used in different senses and the findings of
molecular biology began to be assimilated into a broader evolutionary
perspective.110 Admittedly, the relevant developments in protein
sequencing and, more generally, ‘molecular evolution’ date from three or
more years after the origin of the beanbag genetics dispute. Also, if the
discovery of the double helical structure of DNA is taken as the notional
date of birth of molecular biology, population genetics preceded it by at
least three decades. Still, one sees a continuity in the resistance to the two
views: the older view of population geneticists, that evolution can usefully
be studied by examining the fate of single genes, and the newer view of
molecular biologists, that the near-constant rates of change in DNA
sequence are telling us something interesting about evolution (in both
cases, ‘evolution’ being understood as organismal evolution).
The theme of mathematics in biology has been around for a long
time and will not go away soon. It has two aspects. One concerns the
utility of mathematics in biology, in this case evolutionary biology. The
other, a separate issue, has to do with whether biology can acquire a
theoretical underpinning in the manner of theoretical physics. On the
first point, for organismal biologists, molecular biology and population
genetics were working hand-in-hand: both were perceived to be dealing
– simplistically – in the currency of single genes and their effects. The
approaches were seen as aspects of the same naively reductionist world-
view – and largely incomprehensible. As for the use of mathematics
as such, their attitudes could not have been more different. Haldane’s
109 King and Jukes, 1969.
110 Dietrich, 1998.
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belief was that ‘‘an ounce of algebra is worth a ton of verbal argu-
ment;’’111 indeed his book had ended with the forecast: ‘‘The perme-
ation of biology by mathematics is only beginning…the investigations
here summarised represent the beginning of a new branch of applied
mathematics.’’112
Fisher went so far as to state that a mathematical result derived by
him – roughly, that fitness does not decrease – pointed to a deep analogy
with a well-known physical principle, namely that entropy does not
decrease. Described by him as the ‘‘fundamental theorem’’ of natural
selection, the precise statement was that ‘‘The rate of increase in fitness
of any organism at any time is equal to its genetic variance in fitness at
that time.’’113 Based on the analogy, Fisher claimed for his theorem a
status similar to the second law of thermodynamics: ‘‘It is not a little
instructive that so similar a law should hold the supreme position
among the biological sciences.’’ Crow’s very recent opinion is
unequivocal: Haldane’s Defense of Beanbag Genetics did not go far
enough in its claims for the successes of the mathematical treatment of
evolutionary problems.114 Mayr felt differently, to say the least. In his
view115 ‘‘the only contribution that the mathematical theory had made
was to show that evolution by natural selection could take place in the
time available for it during the history of life on Earth,’’ to which Sarkar
adds ‘‘Interestingly, this was also the question that motivated Haldane
to enter evolutionary biology and this may also account for Mayr’s
preference for Haldane over Fisher and Wright.’’116
It is a different matter whether biology is likely to develop a theo-
retical-mathematical underpinning similar to physics. The utilitarian
role of mathematics and computational modelling in biology, including
evolutionary biology, is beyond question.117 It is equally undeniable
that mathematics is useful when it comes to addressing aspects of sub-
cellular biology – for example, the working of ‘molecular motors’ – or
for treating phenomena such as symmetry and patterning.118 But when
it comes to organisms and species, history plays an essential role in
deciding how biological systems are put together. To a large extent this
111 Maynard Smith, 1965.
112 Haldane, 1932 and 1990, p. 215.
113 Fisher, 1930 and 1958.
114 Crow, 2009.
115 Quoted in Sarkar, 2005.
116 Ibid.
117 Crow, 2009.
118 Forga´cs and Newman, 2005.
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is because natural selection is opportunistic. For this reason, it is open
to question whether there can be a mathematics-based theoretical
biology of organisms similar to theoretical physics.119 Building models
or theorising need not mean the same thing as using mathematics. In
drawing attention to this, Godfrey-Smith makes the intriguing obser-
vation that Darwin’s lack of mathematical ability may have been his
strength: ‘‘He does offer abstract claims…But in fact because he does
not try to formalise […] principles mathematically, he does not find
himself idealising away from the formal nature of organisms very
much’’ but retains a ‘‘focus on the empirical and the concrete.’’120
A. Weismann and H. J. Muller, two prominent evolutionary theorists,
made little or no use of mathematics in their writings.
Summing Up
In one sense, Mayr’s attack is valid: the early models of population
genetics were simplistic. In another sense hemisses the point, because it all
depends on what one expects of models and on one’s own perspective.
AsPlutynski121 explains in the course of a discussionof the relevance of
theories and models in population genetics, theories do not necessarily
deal with reality. How they are assessed depends on both subjective and
historical aspects: ‘‘Scientific theories are supposed to be about the world.
Yet, classical population genetics is a formal discipline treating not so
much the world as possible worlds…Historical context and the interests
of the questioner will determine what counts as an interesting and
important question, and relatedly, what counts as good answer.’’ In other
words, what a model contains depends on how one approaches it. Val-
decasas et al.122 highlight this by focussing on the pedagogical value of
models, on the ‘‘characteristics that make them appropriate for learning
and transmitting knowledge.’’ The value ‘‘heavily depends…on the
individual using them…even very simple models can be useful for
knowledge transmission, as the mental processes of accommodation and
adjustment canmake the connection between the abstract and necessarily
limited model and the contingent reality.’’
119 Nanjundiah, 2005. The reasoning loses some of its force if biological form can be
explained other than as a product of natural selection; see Mu¨ller and Newman (eds.),
2003.
120 Godfrey-Smith, 2009.
121 Plutynski, 2004.
122 Valdecasas et al., 2009.
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Two examples bring out the contrasting attitudes towards abstrac-
tions. The first of them illustrates a reaction commonly experienced by
anyone who has tried to get across the notion that abstractions, in
particular those implicit in mathematical models, can be meaningful. It
is well known that Fisher failed to get his famous paper On the corre-
lation between relatives on the supposition of Mendelian inheritance
published on his first attempt in 1916. Now recognised as a classic of
population genetics theory, the reasons behind its initial rejection are
interesting.123 Both referees turned it down. The geneticist R. C. Pun-
nett was one of them; the biometrician Karl Pearson was the other.
(Fisher memorably remarked that this was the sole occasion on which
the two had been in agreement.) Among the reasons he gave for rejec-
tion, Punnett commented that the paper was ‘‘too much of the order of
problem that deals with weightless elephants upon frictionless sur-
faces….’’ Evidently the analogy was meant to caricature Fisher’s ap-
proach; in the process Punnett failed to notice that ‘weightless’ did away
with the problem altogether. To be fair, the comment continued, ‘‘where
at the same time we are largely ignorant of the other properties of the
said elephants and surfaces,’’ but this qualification is irrelevant for our
point. The astronomer A. S. Eddington showed the opposite attitude
when he used a similar analogy to illustrate how physicists model reality
– in his case the illustration was meant seriously, not as a caricature.
During his celebrated Gifford Lectures,124 Eddington posed a hypo-
thetical examination question in physics that began with the words ‘‘An
elephant slides down a grassy hillside…’’ He went onto explain the
reason for the peculiar wording: it was ‘‘only to give an impression of
realism.’’ Facts that were provided later, namely ‘‘The mass of the
elephant is two tons’’ and ‘‘The slope of the hill is 60,’’ enabled the
student to come to grips with the problem, to ‘‘[get] down to business.’’
Godfrey-Smith125 builds on Plutynski’s reasoning with his own line
of thinking. He points out that the aim of building a model is to mimic
the real situation, not to replicate it, and contrasts idealisation and
abstraction as key aspects of science, especially evolutionary science.
Idealisation treats things as if they possess features they do not have,
but – as with fiction – would be concrete if real (note the similarity with
Lewontin’s use of ‘‘as if’’ mentioned earlier). In contrast, an abstraction
leaves things out while retaining a literally true description. The two
123 Norton and Pearson, 1976.
124 Eddington, 1928.
125 Godfrey-Smith, 2009.
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approaches are complementary. Both can be useful for model building
but both have potential pitfalls. Abstractions can be close to reality but
tend to be difficult to analyse; idealisations are better susceptible to
analysis but maintain a greater distance from reality; they are ‘toy
models.’ When developed around the time when a new line of investi-
gation is begun, the primary value of a model of either sort is heuristic.
Upon exploration the model may show that a particular line of attack
bears promise – or, on the other hand, may look plausible initially but
turn out to be not worth investigating further. Glymour126 echoes
Lerner’s old qualm127 when he says that population genetics models
‘‘are, on their own, inadequate to convey an understanding of selec-
tion,’’ in part because they ignore the processes through which pheno-
types emerge during development: ‘‘The consequences of selection do
not depend on the causal details by which fitness differences arise.’’
To expect that population genetics models should have addressed the
problem of many interacting genes, genotype–environment interactions
and their consequences for the phenotype and therefore fitness, would
have been a tall order 50 years ago. Even today, that problem is reck-
oned to be analytically intractable and computationally forbidding. It
did not help matters that with regard to what were the important
questions, biologists who dealt with entire organisms saw things dif-
ferently from population geneticists. For the latter, a central issue in
evolution, also one that could be modelled, was adaptation. This is why
their focus was on gene frequencies, genetic variation and selection
within populations. For organismal biologists such as Mayr, the title of
Darwin’s book encapsulated the essence of what evolution was all about
– the origin of species. On this issue Mayr’s complaint about Haldane
was on the mark, at least partly: ‘‘…like Darwin, he was much more
concerned with showing that species are related to each other and that
one can derive one species from another, than to show how this oc-
curs.’’128 Haldane acknowledged as much, and when it came to the use
of his models for quantitative genetics, more: ‘‘…both Wright’s work
and my own may seem a little academic to earnest breeders of hogs or
hops.’’129 Mayr highlighted features in the early population genetics
models that would, ipso facto, make it impossible to tackle major issues
concerning evolution, such as speciation. This was hardly news to the
people who built the models. But the complaint was based on what he
126 Glymour, 2006.
127 Lerner, 1954.
128 Mayr, 1992.
129 Haldane, 1963.
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thought ought to have been done, not on what had been done (though,
as we have seen, he did not set much value on that either).
Controversy in science sometimes generates publicity, arguments that
proceed from different assumptions and tension between the concerned
scientists. Rarely has a major dispute gone hand in hand with a friendly
personal relationship between the protagonists. The Beanbag Genetics
dispute is one that comes under such a category. According to Pro-
vine,130 Mayr confessed that he provided the provocation in order to
stimulate further scientific work in the area. Haldane comes across as a
non-dogmatic person, ready to engage in debate.
Ernst Mayr wrote to one of us some months before his death on 3
January 2005:
Prof. Haldane was a dear friend of mine. I greatly admired him and
I thought he was the most brilliant person I met in my whole
life…We had very much the same concept of evolution which is
why we became such good friends…I am a naturalist and in Orissa
I got up at five o clock in the morning and wandered through the
countryside watching birds and other animals and watching the
natives as they came out of their villages to tend their
fields…Haldane was quite angry that I hadn’t taken him along and
joined me next morning at five o clock. I was amazed how inter-
ested he was in the animal life and all sorts of other aspects of
nature. Haldane was a very lovable person in his modesty and
common sense. It was a great loss that he died so relatively young.
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